Schlieffen Plan

>One option could have been a variation of the Manstein Plan from WWII.
Granted, "The Maginot Line" was not built in 1914, so the concept would have been using enough divisions in the German South to hold the line, while a northern group spearheads on a diagonal, northwesterly direction, with the intention of isolated the Belgian (and possibly British) into a pocket.

Again, do not know if such a maneuver would be possible, because not familiar at this moment with the strength numbers on both sides at the time.

That would be impossible to achieve without mechanized forces.

And obviously, all you’d do is trap Belgians. Sickle cut worked because French anticipated German invasion through Belgium and sent their best units north.

>what went wrong?
France's 75 mm field gun prevented Germany from advancing.
It had a burst rate of 15-30 rounds per minute. It was an anti-personel cannon.
If germany had developed tanks before ww1, it would have won easily.

They did.1-2 divisions were attached north to keep the Belgians bottle up at Antwerp. No one really argues this because it's wrong (sorry) The Germans still outnumbered the French 1.5/2-1 in many areas.

Reason why the advance failed is numerous (read guns of August and Holger Herwig) but mostly it was because it was not followed. The Prince of Bavarians southern front was supposed to pull back and and entrap the French, instead they pushed. The center prince of Prussia was supposed to hold, instead they pushed. Von Klick and Bulow were supposed to coordinate together, instead they hated eachother and the BEF and Lanzeracs 5th army exploited the gap between them. Von Hausens 3rd army did not push enough on the Sambre. Moltke never recovered mentally from his conversation with the Kaiser at the start of the war when he realized he was a dolt who would destroy europe. German high command was much too far back, they saw over a decentralized federalist army not a centralized one. They were not expecting such resistance in Belgium. Finally, Moltke pulled some divisions to the East at a key time.

The greatest army the world had and will ever see. Not so much a failure of them IMHO but rather the astounding success of the French at the Marne.

nothing. schlieffen himself believed it wouldn't work, he could never manage to get the calculations to work out - there was no way to get enough men and materiel from germany into france along those roads and rails fast enough to win. not unless by some miracle the french army just collapsed on its own or did something really fucking stupid. this limitation in the flow rates of the roads and rails is one of the major reasons the germans threw so much at the ardennes despite this being contrary to the schlieffen plan - they were looking at 1/3rd of their army waiting on traffic jams trying to get into belgium, so rather than have them sitting out the war waiting for an opening in the road, the germans said fuck it and sent them in on their left. as it was, the whole thing worked out about as well as it could possibly work, but the french army didn't collapse and didn't do anything sufficiently stupid to allow the germans to win.

The difference between ww1 and ww2 - when the germans basically tried it again with a few twists - was mechanization which reduced the amount of materiel needed (no need for bulky horse feed) and greatly increased the flow rate of the roads. the improvements in german tactical doctrine with the radios and tanks and dive bombers helped, but simply increasing the rate of materiel flow was itself sufficient to make the schlieffen plan workable.

>That would be impossible to achieve without mechanized forces.
Then how did the Germans make it all the way to the Marne River in 1914 WWI?
See image.
Notice how far the Germans advanced in 914...?
There are stories of France mobilizing every civilian vehicle in Paris to support relocating troops to the front at the Marne River in 1914 because of the rapid German advance.

The problem was, as noted above, the entire German northern front became an exposed flank which the Entente Forces were able to capitalize on.
Therefore, at the Marne River, the Germans had to halt because they realized their entire northern front became a weak flank that could be exposed -- and was threatened.
At this moment, the French Forces started to push at the Marne River and the Germans consolidated their forces in an orderly retreat eventually forming the trench lines that became the infamous "trench warfare" of WWI.

The reason for the trench warfare on the western front is noticeable in these images, and The First Battle of The Marne is arguably what led to the infamous trench warfare.
Conversely, on the eastern front trench warfare did not become the norm, but on the western front it did, and the reason -- again -- can be seen at The First Battle of The Marne.

The question therefore, is:
---> Could the Germans have relocated enough divisions to their northern front to pocket the Belgians, thereby securing their northern flank, and continuing with their primary advance?
Here, one realizes why von Schleiffen clearly identified securing the coastal region of France and Belgium as essential, because not only did such an operation remove any possibility of a north flank being exposed, it also removed the possibility of the British supporting Belgians.

Personally do think it might have been possible to implement a type of "Manstein Plan" in WWI, yet do not know enough about the "order of battle" situation available to each of the adversaries to verify the theory.

Attached: WWI-Marne-122309final-R1.jpg (1440x957, 546.19K)

They were not used as much as they should have because of the French doctrine of the offensive, troops often charged without waiting for artillery support. Joffre specifically had to order commanders to coordinate the 75s and infantry in a late August for a reason. The 75s also had a very flat trajectory. They were amazing in specific circumstances but not at all flexible or war winning

Germany should have invaded Belgium with 1,5x as many soldiers as they did, aiming for surrender request within August already. This didn't happen bc Willhelm was too scared of the war

>France's 75 mm field gun prevented Germany from advancing.
>It had a burst rate of 15-30 rounds per minute. It was an anti-personel cannon.
>If germany had developed tanks before ww1, it would have won easily.
Neat!
These are the factors one would have to be familiar with if they were to adequately provide a response to the question here:
>I see what do you think they should have done then? Put more troops thought the top of Belgium and take them away from the Russian side?
All of the factors at the time (such as available artillery, placement of such artillery, railroads, telegraph wires, and so on) would have to be considered when provided an answer in support of a theory. It's easy to draw lines on a map demonstrating battle plans, yet those "lines on map" take on new meaning when they are accompanied by footnotes detailing: logistical infrastructure (railroads; telegraph lines; etc.); artillery; and so on.

It's probable the German General Moltke was aware of such factors hence why he implemented his own variation of the "Schleiffen Plan"; yet have not thoroughly studied Moltke's reasons as to why he left his northern flank exposed.

Perhaps someone in this thread knows the reason as to why Moltke left his northern flank vulnerable?
-- The exposed German northern flank is clearly visible in the map above.
Surely Moltke would have been aware that his northern flank was vulnerable to an attack by the British reinforcing the Belgians, and perhaps he was gambling on France capitulating as was done during the Franco Prussian War when the Germans reached Paris?
Again, do not know.

Most things are relative. In 1940 they had to move so quickly because the French could react so quickly. In 1914 practically nobody had radios and those who did weren't encrypting messages. Nobody was really motorized. Foot soldiers vs foot soldiers it was still feasible to carry out similar plans, just slower. The only factor would be rapid was of BEF shipping across the channel and how quickly they reacted to German advances, but I don't see why it would have been out of the realm of possibility in 1914.

shut up the 75mm field gun was revolutionary and the germans had nothing like it.